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The anticommons at twenty: 
concerns for research continue 
Emerging trends in exclusionary rights may affect research. 
By Jorge L. Contreras 
Fifty	 years	 ago,	 Hardin	 famously	 predicted	
that	unrestrained	use	of	a	common	resource	
could	lead	to	its	overuse	and	depletion	–	the	
so-called	 “tragedy	of	 the	 commons”.	Thirty	
years	later,	Heller	and	Eisenberg	introduced	
the	term	“anticommons”	to	the	research	pol-





holders	 of	 intellectual	 property	 (IP)	 rights,	
particularly	 patents,	 covering	 a	 biomedical	
technology	 can	 individually	 block	 others	
from	 conducting	 research	 on	 that	 technol-
ogy,	then	overall	research	progress	could	be	
stifled.	 Though	many	 observers	 now	 agree	
20	years	later	that	empirical	evidence	of	an	
anticommons	 in	 biomedical	 research	 is	 in-
conclusive	(4),	 if	not	wholly	refuted	(5,	26),	
there	are	emerging	areas	beyond	patent	law	
in	 which	 the	 proliferation	 of	 exclusionary	







ual	 owner	 may	 block	 others’	 use	 of	 the	
whole.	 Heller	 and	 Eisenberg	 were	 particu-
















they	 argued,	 can	 the	 inefficiencies	 that	 are	





strictive	 licensing	 practices	 that	 interfere	
with	downstream	product	development.”	
			In	 their	 conceptualization	of	 the	anticom-
mons,	Heller	and	Eisenberg	challenged	ear-
lier	theoretical	work	(e.g.,	(17))	that	argued	
that	 assets,	 including	 inventions	 and	 other	
intangibles,	will	be	put	to	their	highest	and	
best	use	only	if	they	are	affected	with	private	
interests	 that	 incentivize	 their	 owners	 to	
manage	and	exploit	them	efficiently	–	a	prop-







vatization	 strategies,	 tragedies	 of	 the	 com-
mons	can	also	be	solved	by	collective	man-
agement	of	common	assets.	In	the	regime	of	
the	 anticommons,	 it	 is	 excessive	 privatiza-





researchers	 began	 to	 seek	 empirical	 evi-
dence	of	a	developing	anticommons	in	bio-
medical	 research.	 The	 proliferation	 of	 pa-
tents	on	individual	genes	and	key	sequencing	
processes	 was	 of	 particular	 concern.	 One	
study	reported	that	U.S.	patents	covered	ap-
proximately	 20%	 of	 known	 human	 genes	
(3),	 and	 another	 found	 that	 patents	 had	 a	
negative	impact	on	the	use	and	development	
of	molecular	diagnostic	tests	(21).	





bers	 of	 genetic	 variants,	 as	 well	 as	 high-
throughput	genotyping	and	sequencing	plat-
forms	 and	 animal	models	 (19).	 A	 different	
angle	on	the	potential	impact	of	propertiza-
tion	of	genetic	 information	on	downstream	






tions	 in	 subsequent	 scientific	 research	 and	
product	development”	(22).		
Findings	 like	 these	 set	 off	 alarm	 bells	
throughout	 the	 research	 community	 and	






















			Heller	 and	 Eisenberg	 recognized	 that	 the	





features	 of	 the	 biotechnology	 and	pharma-
ceutical	industries	that	could	make	success-
ful	 bargaining	 over	 patent	 rights	 less	 suc-
cessful	 than	 in	 fields	 such	 as	 aviation	 and	
music,	 including:	 transaction	 costs	 associ-
ated	 with	 accumulating	 sufficient	 rights	 to	
practice	biotechnology	inventions;	the	heter-
ogeneous	 interests	 of	 patent	 holders;	 and	
cognitive	 biases	 causing	 patent	 holders	 to	
over-estimate	 the	 value	 of	 their	 own	 tech-
nical	contributions	(1).		
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	 But	 despite	 years	 of	 advocacy	 sur-










uct	 development,	 clinical	 trials	 and	 regula-
tory	 approval;	 patent	 holders’	 desire	 to	
retain	 control	 over	 their	 assets;	 and	 con-
cerns	 over	 compromising	 commercial	 se-
crecy	by	collaborating	with	others	(26).	
While	the	formal	pooling	of	fragmented	










often	 traced	 to	 the	 1996	 Bermuda	 accord	
reached	 by	 leaders	 of	 the	Human	Genome	







the	 commercial	 sector	 (9).	 Voluntary	 data	
sharing	by	research	institutions	and	corpo-
rations	 has	 also	 emerged	 in	 areas	 such	 as	


















Eisenberg.	 For	 example,	 in	 line	 with	 their	
recommendation	 that	 upstream	 research	
tools	 be	 licensed	 broadly	 and	 non-exclu-
sively,	NIH	adopted	a	policy	in	1999	urging	
its	 grant	 recipients	 to	 license	 patented	 re-
search	tools	on	a	non-exclusive	basis	in	order	







than	 one	 hundred	 research	 institutions	
around	 the	 world	 have	 voluntarily	 sub-
scribed	to	the	Nine	Points.	
Finally,	over	the	past	decade	patent	laws	





































challenges	 research	 in	 ways	 different	 than	
patents.	For	example,	a	patent	 is	an	official	
document	 that	 publicly	 discloses	 the	 pa-
tented	 invention,	 thus	 enabling	 others	 to	
study	 and	 improve	 upon	 its	 features	 and	
techniques.	 Trade	 secrets,	 by	 their	 nature,	
need	never	be	disclosed	 to	 the	world,	 thus	
limiting	 the	 opportunity	 for	 follow-on	 re-
search	and	improvements.	
If	more	 data	 is	 treated	 as	 secret	 by	 re-
searchers,	there	may	be	less	overall	growth	




















ers	 are	 not	 precluded	 from	 independently	













access	 (4).	 As	 such,	 a	 data-driven	 anticom-





encouragement	 (or	 requirement)	 of	 data	






with	 respect	 to	 emerging	 biomedical	 tech-






estate	 via	 narrowly-drawn	 licensing	 agree-
ments	controlled	by	a	handful	of	private	“sur-
rogate”	 companies	 empowered	by	 the	 aca-
demic	 research	 institutions	 that	 made	
foundational	CRISPR	discoveries	(12).	These	
companies	 may	 have	 incentives	 to	 license	
technology	 to	 others	 on	 a	 limited	 gene-by-
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gene,	 indication-by-indication	 basis	 that	
does	not	encourage	the	full	breadth	of	poten-
tial	research	and	product	development.	And	
while	 some	 CRISPR	 patent	 holders	 have	









prove	 to	 be	 insufficient,	 research	 funding	
agencies	could	more	definitively	require	the	



















terest	 in	 information	 about	 themselves,	
including	the	right	to	receive	compensation	











sive	 studies,	 or	 could	 withdraw	 their	 data	











Though	 the	 patent-driven	 biomedical	 anti-
commons	 envisioned	 by	 Heller	 and	 Eisen-
berg	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 emerged	
widely,	researchers	and	policy	makers	must	
remain	vigilant	as	new	sources	of	potential	







tensive	 propertization	 with	 fragmentation	
and	parcelization	of	 ownership	 can	 lead	 to	














anticommons	 should	 be	 considered	 and	
weighed	in	the	balance.	
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